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Introduction
Hundreds of millions of dollars have been recently invested to address Illegal Wildlife Trade 7 138 the small populations. Of the 109 people approached in the first round of interviews at Chitwan, 139 Kathmandu Central, Kathmandu Jagannath, Bardiya and Parsa prisons (October 2016 to 140 February 2017), 88 participated (19.3% refusal rate). We then conducted a second round of 141 interviews to increase our sample size at Lalitpur, Rasuwa and Chitwan prions (June-August 142 2017). In this round 45 people were approached and 28 participated, with the refusal rate 143 (37.8%) climbing following reports that the government was further charging prisoners for their 144 historic involvement in IWT. This happens as new information comes to light, and was not 145 connected to this research, of which we reassured participants prior to gaining consent. 146 Interviews were conducted in Nepali by the lead author, a male who grew up in rural Nepal and 147 has a personal understanding of wild resource harvest and prior experience conducting 148 interviews in prison setting (Paduel, 2015) . Prior to interviews, we obtained informed oral 149 consent, following established ethical standards for criminological research (BSC, 2006) and 150 institutional review (Lancaster University FST REC 16045), including explanation that 151 participation was voluntary, anonymous, and would not affect respondents' sentences. 152 Interviews lasted approximately 1 hour, having been granted national permission for extended 153 visiting times (usually 20 minutes), and were conducted in private. As audio-recording was 154 forbidden under prison rules, responses were recorded manually on the research instrument, with 155 more detailed notes written up after each interview.
156
Interviews were structured (full interview schedule in English and Nepali available in participated in, species hunted and traded; (4) current crime and sentence; (5) motives for 162 participating in IWT; (6) knowledge of IWT laws and regulation; (7) perception of deterrence, 163 including perceptions of the risk of being caught, and; (8) social impacts of their incarceration, 164 including impacts on family. Our questions about their knowledge of IWT laws and penalties 165 were informed by a review of wildlife legislation in Nepal and the associated species-wise 166 sanctions ( Supplementary Table 1 ). We included some open questions throughout the interview 167 to follow up on responses to closed questions, including further exploration of respondents' 168 experiences with imprisonment as a result of IWT and the impacts this had on their families.
169
Data from closed questions were coded and analysed using SPSS v.24 to generate descriptive 170 statistics and, using Spearman's Rho correlations, to explore the relationships among variables. 171 We specifically looked at what variables would help us understand variation in respondents' 172 awareness of the laws. For this, three interview questions about knowledge of IWT regulations 173 were combined into a single ordinal variable, "Overall awareness of laws" (range 0-4, using the 174 first three variables in Table 4 ). We then tested what variables might be explanatory, expecting 175 age, education and economic status to be potential predictors of variation in their knowledge of 176 regulations ( Supplementary Table 3 ). We also explored the relationships between reported 177 motives for participating in IWT and demographic variables, again expecting that factors such as 178 economic status would correlate with motivations such as nutritional and basic economic need 179 ( Supplementary Table 4 ). However, quantitative analyses options were limited by the sample 180 size and heterogeneity within the dataset (e.g., Chi Square results not valid, sample too small for 181 meaningful Latent Class Analysis), and those that we could conduct revealed few significant 
Results
Out of 74 prisons across Nepal, 38 prisons hosted a total of 384 IWT prisoners during the start of 207 research in late 2016 (Figure 1 , Supplementary Table 2) , although no historical baseline has been 208 compiled to enable comparison. People convicted for IWT represented a small part of the prison 209 population at most sites (0.1-3.3%), but formed 21.1% of the total prison populations in Chitwan 210 District Prison, 9.6% in Bardia District Prison and 6.4% in Rasuwa District Prison.
212
Respondents participated in a range of roles across IWT market chains, including harvest, 213 transport and retail. Harvest was the most common role reported, and only a small number of 214 respondents were involved in international transport (12%, Table 2 ).
[ Table 2 here] Most respondents self-reported as 'poor' across several metrics (Table 3) . Self-reported 230 household income at the time of arrest placed most respondents' households under the World 231 Bank defined poverty line for Nepal (56.0%; approx. US $ 1.9/person/day). Most respondents 232 also reported that their household income was not enough on which to survive (36.2%) or only 233 enough to cover the day-to-day costs of living (47.4%), with >80% of respondents responsible 234 for at least one dependent (Table 2 ).
[ 
Motives for participating in IWT 278
Respondents reported diverse motivations for participation in IWT (Table 5) . Few relied on it as 279 a primary livelihood, and direct household need was not a leading reported motivation (e.g., 280 money to meet basic needs, 11.2%; IWT to meet nutritional needs, 6.0%). Instead, IWT served 281 primarily to earn extra money (87.9%) and represented a less tiring job than alternative sources 282 of income (37.1%). Family food situation was weakly correlated to the motivation of nutritional 283 need (r=0.249; p<0.01) and moderately correlated to the motivation of needing money to meet 284 basic household needs, and household economic status was moderately related to needing money 285 to meet basic household needs (r=.452; p<0.01). We also identified a weak correlation between 286 age of first involvement in IWT and the motivation of finding IWT easier than other work 287 options (r=.286; p<0.01). No significant relationships were found between reported motivations 288 and demographic variables ( Supplementary Table 4 ). 
Discussion

293
Amidst widespread calls for strengthened enforcement to protect biodiversity from IWT, we 294 know very little about the people being imprisoned for these crimes. This study provides unique 295 demographic and motivational data necessary for developing effective and equitable 296 conservation policies. There were clear patterns in respondent demographics, and our sample 297 was principally poor, illiterate, with 75% coming from historically-marginalised indigenous communities (Table 2) , although these groups make up only 35.8% of Nepal's population (CBS, 299 2011). However, when considering other variables (e.g. awareness of rules, employment, 300 motivations), our sample was very heterogeneous. The sample size, while large by the standards 301 of prison interview research, was too small to make meaningful attempts at using statistical 302 analysis techniques to develop a typology based on cluster analysis (e.g., via Latent Class 303 Analysis). Nevertheless, the descriptive data illustrates the diversity of IWT involvement. Criminology offers insights into how to increase the effectiveness of enforcement-based 319 conservation approaches in ways that also help to address social equity. In particular, rational 320 actor perspectives posit that the decision whether or not to commit a crime will depend on the balance between the perceived associated risks and rewards. Classic theory argues that the 322 deterrence effect of a punishment depends on the severity, celerity (swiftness of enforcement) 323 and certainty of punishment following a crime, weighed against the motivation to commit the 324 crime in the first place (Nagin et al. 2018 ). In the context of this sample, punishment turned out 325 to be certain, severe and swift. All of our respondents were convicted offenders who were 326 imprisoned (certainty) and experienced considerable sanctions (severity): not only were there 327 384 people identified as imprisoned for IWT, but we found significant fines and imprisonment 328 (often >5 years, Figure 1 ). Moreover, verdicts indicated the use of judicial discretion to apply 329 high sanctions, particularly for rhinoceros trade (Figure 1 ). The results also highlighted a range 330 of downstream social impacts on respondents and respondents' families. In addition, most 331 respondents were arrested shortly after their first involvement in IWT (high celerity). The respondents, most did not report basic household needs-either economic or nutritional-as their primary motivations for participating in IWT (Table 5 ). Making extra money was overwhelmingly the most common primary motive, followed by the perception that IWT is a less 345 tiring job that its alternatives. This mirrors our finding that IWT was not pursued as a primary 346 employment by the vast majority of respondents, and that often aspiration (rather than 347 desperation) may be an important IWT driver in some contexts. Peer pressure was also a poor local residents, the "small fish and scapegoats" who are most easily subject to enforcement, 436 while higher-level "intellectual actors" are infrequently arrested (Ghale, 2017; see Phelps et al., 437 2016).
439
While the results cannot explain why these populations are so disproportionately represented in 440 our dataset, this skew has significant implications for social equity dimensions of enforcement-441 based conservation. This apparent targeting exemplifies the differentiated, inequitable social 442 impacts that can arise from enforcement-based conservation (see West et al., 2006) , which are 443 not a mainstream part of conservation dialogues in Nepal (see Greenhood Nepal, 2018) . IWT. This has profound implications for the efficiency of conservation investments and for 456 unintended social outcomes. This is meaningful not only because reducing imprisonment is important to individual 466 perpetrators and their communities, but also because it reflects whether enforcement investments 467 are resulting in meaningful change. Indeed, there is a need to better reflect on the intended 468 outcomes that conservation agencies expect will arise from increased enforcement, and there is 469 concern that many interventions may not be accounting for the causal chains linking actions to 470 outcomes (see Biggs et al., 2017) . In this case, conservation may best be achieved not through 471 strengthened enforcement alone, but also by accounting for perpetrator knowledge, motives and 472 perceptions of risk, as well as enforcement biases towards certain taxa and types of perpetrators. 
Conclusion
